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Command-and-control  environmental  policies  andmarket-based
incentive  policies  differ in administrative  cost, level of control
over polluters,  monitoring  and  compliance  requirements,  incen-
tives for polluters  to invest in pollution abatement,  and fiscal
consequences  to the government.
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Increasing urbanization and industrialization can  polluting activities are subsidized, so curtailing
exacerbate pollution problems in developing  them brings both fiscal and environmental
countries. Tax revenues in developing countries  benefits. Taxing polluting inpats and outputs is a
are too low to support adequate infrastructure for  particularly attractive polic,  in developing
treating and disposing of wastes, but the problem  countries, which often lack experience in admin-
is also attributable to the classic problem of  istering ard  enforcing other types of environ-
externalities in production and consumption.  mental regulation. Corrective taxes make use of
"Externalities" means that the costs of environ-  existing administrative structures and increase
mental degradation are not considered by the  tax revenues, which can be spent on public
private decisionmakers undertaking the activities  goods to improve environmental quality (includ-
that cause the problems.  ing treatment facilities for water and sewage,
waste disposal, and sanitatior) or can be used to
Two types of policies are commonly consid-  reduce other taxes (which are often highly
ered to correct this market failure and improve  distortionary in countries with a narrow tax
the allocation of resources: command-and-  base).
control policies (such as emission and abatement
standards) and market-based incentive policies  Which goods and inputs to single out for
(such as emissions charges, taxes on production  corrective taxation depends on the main sources
and consumption, and marketable pollution  of pollution, which varies from country to
quotas), which raise the price of such activities  country. Air pollution from vehicles is growing
for the perpetrators.  in many countries, where increased fuel taxes,
perhaps coupled with improved regulations for
Maiket-based incentives theoretically reduce  vehicle maintenance, may be desirable. Higher
pollution at least cost and increase goverment  taxes on high-sulphur coal would curb both
revenues, but may require costly monitoring to  industrial and household emissions of sulphur
be effective, and are usually implemented in an  dioxide. Charges can be implemented for fixed-
environment of imperfect information about the  site easy-to-monitor industrial emissions.
costs of abatement. Sometimes command-and-  Subsidies to industries that cause pollution
control policies make more economic sense in  should be phased out and those indu.tries should
this environment.  be subjected to higher-than-average tax rates.
Efficiency gains from curbing pollution in
developing countries may be large. Some
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Pollutior.  problems  in developing  countries  are  of  growing
concern, particularly air and water pollution in rapidly growing
urban  areas.  In large part this problem is attributable to the
classic problem of externalities in  production and consumption, and
can  be  expected  to  grow  worse  with  the  success  of  industrial
development policies.  In addition there is inadequate public good
infra-structure for treating and disposing of  waste products.  This
lack  is  due  in  part  to  inadequate  3evels  of  tax  revenue  in
developing countries.
"Externality" describes the fact that the costs of pollution
and other  forms of environmental degradation are not taken  into
consideration by the decision-makers undertaking activities which
cause these problems.  A rationale exists for government policies
to  correct  this  market  failure  and  achieve  a  more  efficient
allocation  of  resources.  These  policies  include  command  and
control  type  policies which  restrict the quantities  of  harmful
activities  and  market-based  incentive policies  which  raise  the
price of these activities to the perpetrators.  The former include
emission  and  abatemient standards  while  the  latter  include
emissions  charges,  taxes  on  production  and  consumption,  and
marketable pollution quotas.
The available instruments of environmental policy differ  in
terms of administrative cost, level of control over the actions of
polluters, monitoring and compliance requirements, incentives for
polluters to engage in  pollution abatement investment, and in terms
of  the  fiscal  consequences  to  the  government.  T1  primary
advantages of market based incentives is that they induce polluters
to reduce pollution at least cost and that they may raise needed
revenue for the government.  However, environmental policies are
usually  implemented under circumstances of imperfect information
about the costs of abatement, and also require costly monitoring
activity by the government to be effective.  In some cases these
considerations favor the use of command and control type policies.
The  efficiency  gains  to  curbing  pollution  in  developing
economies may be large.  In some cases, polluting activities are
subsidized  so curtailing these activities has fiscal benefits as
well as environmental.  The use of taxes on polluting  inputs and
outputs is a  particularly attractive policy in  developing countries
which often lack experience with administering and enforcing other
forms of environn.ental  regulation.  Corrective taxes make use of
existing administrativa structures and have the additional appeal
of raising tax revenue.  This revenue can be spent on public goods
which improve environmental quality, or used to reduce other taxes
which  are  often  highly  distortionary  in  developing  economies
because of their narrow tax base.
.i.iThe actual goods  and inputs  that should  be singled out for
corrective  taxation  depends  on  the  major  sources  of pollution  which
varies from country to country.  However, vehicular-source  air
pollution is rapidly growing in many countries so a policy of
increased fuel  taxes, perhaps coupled with  improved vehicle
maintenance  regulations,  would be desirable  in these countries.
Also,  increased taxes  on  high-sulphur coal  wc-ild  curb  both
industrial  and household sources of sulphur dioxide pollution.
Charges  can  be  implemented for  fixed-site, easy-to-monitor
industrial  emissions. Existing  subsidies  to industries  which  cause
pollution should  be phased  out, and eventually  these industries
should be subject to higher than average tax rates.  The tax
revenues  ra±sed  from  corrective  taxes  and  emissions  charges  should
be used  to finance  investments  in  water  and sewage  treatment,  and
improvements  in  waste  disposal  and sanitation  facilities.
ivI.  Introduotion:  Pollution Problems in Developing Countries
In  this  section,  we  introduce  the  nature  of  some  of  the
pollution  problems  currently  facing  developing  countries.  The
stylized  facts about  pollution problems in developing  countries
presented here are designed to contribute to subsequent discussion
about the environmental impacts  of fiscal  reforms and environmental
policies.  To determine the potential effectiveness of alternative
policy instruments in dealing with the emerging polluticn problems
in developing countries, it is important to understand the source
and  nature  of  the  pollution.  We  clessify  different  types  of
environmental degradation according to  whether they are best viewed
as the  result  of market  failure, the absence  of a  public  good
infrastructure for treating or abating the pollution, or the result
of traditional household practices.
A.  Air Pollution in Developing Countries
Air  pollution,  particularly  in urban  areas  of  developing
countries, is of growing concern.' The sources of air pollution in
developing countries are varied.  In Mexico City, for example, the
leading source of carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and
nitrous oxides is the emissions from motor vehicles.  Xn China and
India, air pollution fror -. oal burning is at a very high level and
attracting  the  attention  of  urganizations  like WHO.  In these
countries coal burning i: used,  ￿._  only for industrial processes
and  electricity  generation,  but  also  for domestic  heating  andcooking.  In contrast, in sub-Saharan  African countries the use of
biofuels for cooking is of greater concern.  While it is difficult
to draw a general picture of air pollution problems applicable to
all developing countries, following Krupnick (1990) we attempt to
describe  the  nature  of  air  pollution  problems  common  to  many
developing  countries and note the difference relative to typical
air pollution 1:oblems in more dev3loped countries.
Air  pollution  is  generated  by  point  sources  (e.g.
manufacturing  industries and  electrical power  plants),  domestic
sources  (e.g., the burning of coal, firewood, or animal dung for
heating  and  cooking),  and mobile  sources  (e.g., cars,  trucks,
buses, and scooters).  In many developing countries, the burning of
coal  for  industrial processes and heating is a major  source of
suspended  particulates  and  sulphur  dioxide.  We  have  already
mentioned China and India in this regard.  Many Eastern European
countries suffer from the same industrial source of  air pollution.
For example, Poland meets three-rourths of its current energy needs
through the combustion of locally  mined coal (Jimenez  and Eskeland,
1990).  This  compares  unfavorably  with  Western  Europe  and  the
United States, which meets approximately only one-fourth of their
energy  requirements with coal-fired power plants. In  Eastern Europe
the burning of coal, and the resulting emission of sulphur dioxide
and suspended particulates, contributes to serious respiratory and
other health problems.
2In  rural  areas  of  many  developing  countries,  indoor  air
pollution poses a serious health threat, part3cularly to women and
children.  The use of coal, firewood, and aniAal dung for heating
and  cooking  purposes,  generates  harmful  particulates,  carbon
monoxide, and nitrous oxides.  The level of exposure of individuals
in the household to these indoor air  pollutants depends on the type
of fuel consumed, the degree of ventilation, and the tvpe of stove
used.  Indoor  air pollution  in many urban  areas throughout  the
developing world may not be as serious a problem as in rural areas
because the urban population tends to rely upon relatively cleaner
fuels (e.g.,  gas and coal briquettes) for cooking.  As reported by
'rupnick (1990),  Smith  (1987,  1988)  provides  a  comprehensive
discussion  of the  environmental  consequences  of household  fuel
consumption patterns in developing countries. 2
Mobile sources of air pollution are a growing concern in many
developing countries.  In 1980, there were over thirty-five cities
with populations exceeding four million, and by the year 2000, that
number  is expected to nearly double  (World Health  Organization,
1988).  In many  of  these  large cities,  concentrations  of  air
pollutants exceed WHO guidelines, and one of the major sources of
conventional air pollutants are mobile sources.
Although  auto  ownership  and  use  rates  are  much  lower  in
developing  countries  than  in developed countries,  air pollution
from  mobile  sources  is rising  rapidly.  According  to  Krupnick
3(1990),  the United Nations (1989a)  reports  automobiles  per 1000
people  in developing  country  cities  are  generally  less  than  fifty,
as compared  to between  two  and  five  hundred  in  developed  countries.
However, all developing  countries  reporting  vehicle-kilometers-
traveled in 1977 and 1987  experienced  significant  increases.  In
another  United  Nations  study  (1989b),  it is reported  that  vehicle
ownership  is  growing  tremendously  in  many  developing  countries. In
Indonesia  vehicle ownership  tripled  from 1970  to 1981, in Brazil
and Lagos  it  more  than  doubled,  while  in  Nigeria  vehicle  ownership
quintupled.  In some cities,  the problem  may be critical in the
near  future. Vehicle  ownership  in  Greater  Bangkok  is  projocted  to
increese  from  less  than  six-hundred  thousand  in 1989  to  two  million
by the year 2006 (Jimenez  and Es:eland,  1990).
The pollution problems attributable  to mobile sources are
particu.Lar.Ly  pronounced in some cities.  Nuccio, Ornelas, and
Restrepo  (1990)  report  that  atmospheric  pollution  in  Mexico  City  is
a grave  problem. While  industry  contributes  twenty  percent  of the
annual  total  of atmospheric  contaminants  to the  Metropolitan  Zone
of Mexico  City --  approximately 393,000 tons of sulphur dioxide,
130,000 tons of hydrocarbons,  114,000 tons of carbon monoxide,
91,000  tons  of  nitric  oxide, and  383,000 tons  of  diverse
particulate matter --  these tctals are dwarfed by the contribution
from  mobile  sources,  which  account  for  over eighty  percent  of the
tonnage  emitted. The serious  air  pollution  problem  in  Mexico  City
is the result of several factors:  the growth in the number of
4vehicles (which  grew six times as fast at the population  in the
Federal  district  between  1940  and 1980),  the  types  of fuel  used in
them,  the lack of strict  control  over  the maint.nance  of motors,
and the atmospheric  conditions  prevailing  in the irea.  The heavy
reliance on leaded gasoline  in Mexico City, and throughout  the
developing  world,  contributes  to elevated  lead  levels  in the  blood
of residents. 3
In nearly all developing countries  leaded gasoline  is more
common  than  unleaded. In  contrast,  nearly  all  developed  countries
have taken  steps  to phase  out leaded  gasoline. With  the increased
use of gasoline,  lead is rising  in the blood of people  living in
the  industrial  areas of developing  countries (Krupnick,  1990).
Young  children  are at the  greatest  risk  of adverse  effects  due to
lead.  In reviewing  studies  conducted  in a number  of countries,
Branigan  (1988)  notes  that  children  with  elevated  blood  lead  levels
tend to have slower  rates of mental  development. Lead has also
been linked  with  high-blood  pressure  and  heart  attacks  in  men,  and
it is associated  with decreased  fertility,  ia.creased  miscarriage,
and neonatal  morbidity  in  women.
Although there is much uncertainty  aboat the link between
conventional  air pollutants  and chronic respiratory  disease and
mortality, in part because  dose-response  relationships  have not
been  quantitatively  established  in  developing  countries,  there  are
reasons  to be concerned  about  the  health  effects  of air  pollution
5in  the  developing  world. Krupnick  (1990)  notes  that  there  is  well-
documented  evidence  that  mortality  from  chronic  pulmonary  disease
and  acute respiratory infections  are very high  in developing
countries,  and that morbidity  rates are high in urban areas of
developing  countries  'oompared  to rates  in  developed  countries. He
reports  that,  according  to the  Chinese  Ministry  of Public  Health,
the incidence  of chronic  bronchitis  is ten  times  higher  in Chinese
cities polluted by coal emissions than in control areas, and
children  are more likely  to have worse health if they live in a
coal burning  household. Rates  of chronic  bronchitis  are three  to
four  times  as great in  countries  like  India  and Nepal  as they  are
in the United  States. Thomas (1985),  in a study  of air pollution
in Brazil, reports that poor air quality in recent  years may be
significantly  link?d  to  mortalit"  in San Paulo.
In  summarizing  the  serious  nature  of  air  pollution  problems  in
developing  countries,  Krupnick  (1990)  contends  that "rapid  growth
of  urban  areas  of  developing  has  led  to  major  violations  of ambient
air quality  standards  and is probably  responsible  for significant
degradation  of health. The future,  with leaps  in  urban  population
and  income, is even less promising for the urban environment
without  policies  in  place  to address  the  major  current  problems  of
industrial,  diesel,  vehicle  and  cooking (plus  heating)  emissions,
and the emerging  problems  associated  with  emissions  from  gasoline
vehicles"  (p.47).
6B.  Water  PollutJon  in Developing  Countries
Unfortunately,  serious  water  pollution  problems  are  prevalent
JI many developing  countries  as well.  Water,  of course, serves
several  functions. Pearce  and  Turner  (1990)  report  that  human  and
livestock  consumption  account  for five  and three  percent  of world
wa-t-  use  respectively.  Industry  and  mining  account  for  twenty-two
percent, while irrigation  accounts  for seventy  percent of world
water  use.  The  percentage accounted for  by  irrigation is
considerably  higher  in some  developing  countries.
Some of the  water  pollution  problems  in developing  countries
can be traced to irrigation  and fertilization  practices and a
growing reliance  on pesticides.  Agricultural  runoff from lands
heavily fertilized  and crops  intensively  sprayed  with pesticides
often  finds  its way  back to  the  rivers which provided the
irrigation  water and which also serve  as the source  of drinking
water for downstream  populations.  The use of pesticides and
fertilizers  is often  subsidized  by government.  For example,  in
Egypt, cotton farmers use organophorphorus  and  organochlorine
pesticides to protect their crop, and the Egyptian government
spends over $200 million each year to subsidize  this practice
(Choucri,  Brown,  and  Hans, 1990).
The damming  of rivers  for  perennial  irrigation  and  permanent
water supplies  is sometimes  not without  unintended,  but adverse,
7environmental consequences.  The High Dam in Egypt has created a
habitat for water-disease.  According to Choucri, Brown, and Haas
(1990), "schistosomiasis has  greatly increased, migrating  south
from Cairo, and now thirty-six percent of the population suffers
from  the  disease.  The  portion  is  higher  among  the  rural
population, for whom it is an occupational hazard.  The disease is
extremely debilitating, and it costs Egypt on the order of $500
million a year"  (pp. 103-4).
Water pollution problems are often very pronounced  in urban
areas.  In Cairo, enteric diseases and dysenteries are the major
causes of death among young children (The  World Bank, 1989).  Much
of the problem  is due to the strain placed  on sewage treatment
systems by a growing population.  Most sewage in the Cairo area is
only partly treated or untreated before it is discharged to open
drains.
The lack of access to safe drinking water is a problem common
to  many  developing  countries.  According  to  UNICEF's  report
entitled,  The  State  of  the  World's  Children  1985,  in  fifteen
countries,  access  to safe drinking water was  available  to only
twenty percent or less of the population  (reported in Pearce and
Turner,  1990).  Some cities, like Calcutta for example, represent
dramatic  failures  in terms  of  the provision  of  adequate  water
supplies and sanitation facilities, and quite often, urban areas
are fairly characterized as possessing both serious air and water
8pollution problems.  In  Mex3co, the focus of some of our discussion
of air pollution problems, water basins serving fifty-nine percent
of  the  population  are  classified  "most  polluted"  (Jimenez  and
Eskeland, 1990).
The global picture is  no more encouraging.  Munasinghe (1990),
in  a  World  Bank  Environment  Department  Working  Paper  (No.41),
describes the situation as follows (on  p.3):
In 1980  some two  billion people  lacked adequate water  and
sanitation.  Global  coverage  of  water  supply  (defined as
access  to a  safe water  supply) stood at about  40 percent.
Sanitation coverage (defined as access to a facility for the
storage, transportation, or  processing of  waste) was lower, at
about 25 percent.  Coverage was lower in rural areas than in
suburban  areas  and  for  lower  income  people  wherever  they
lived.  At the end of the Decade (the 1980's], it is becoming
clear that the original goals [of  the United Nations, that all
people have access to clean water and adequate sanitation by
1990] will be reached only by a few countries.  While there
are  significant  variations  among  geographic  regions,  the
overall  progress  has  not  been  encouraging  for  both  water
supply and sanitation coverage, from 1970 to 1990.
Population  growth,  particularly  in urban  areas,  poses  a  major
challenge  to the public  sectors of many developing  countries in
their  attempts  to  reach  water  and  sanitation  goals.  As
discouraging as the coverage picture is in many urban areas, it is
often  worse  in rural areas of developing countries  (Munasinghe,
1990).  While an additional 310 million rural residents received
access to an adequate and safe water supply from 1980 to 1988, by
the end of 1988 there were still approximately 915 million without
access.  By the  end of  1988 there were  over  1.4 billion rural
residents  without  access  to  an  appropriate  means  of  excreta
disposal.
9C.  A Problem  of Market  Failure  or Lack  of Infrastructure?
Many water pollution  problems in developing  countries are
probably  best  viewed  as failures  to provide  the  appropriate  public
good infrastructure  for treating  the water.  That is, given the
difficulty  of monitoring  nonpoint  water  pollution,  the expenditure
of public funds on treatment facilities  for dealing with raw
sewage,  in  particular,  may  represent  the  least  cost  alternative  for
remedying  a serious  pollution  problem.  However,  least  cost  does
not mean inexpensive.
In order to provide all citizens  access  to clean  water and
adequate sanitation,  one estimate  suggests that governments in
developing  countries  must  invest  US$15  billion  annually  starting  in
1990  (Munasinghe,  1990). Currently,  total  foreign  aid  flows  to the
water  sectors  in  developing  countries  is  approximately  US$1
billion,  less  than  ten  percent of  the  aforementioned water
investment  requirement. It  should  be  noted  that  complete  coverage
of water supply  and adequate  sanitation  may be an unrealistic  and
overly  ambitious  goal;  nevertheless,  the overwhelming  majority  of
the  water sector and waste treatment investments  required to
provide improved access to safe drinking water may have to be
financed  internally  within  these  typically  capital-scarce
developing  economies. The revenue  requirements  to remedy  serious
water pollution  problems  should  serve to focus attention  on the
10importance of  fiscal reform and  the  potential benefits  of
environmental  taxes  and user  charges.
In contrast,  many of the air pollution  problems  previously
discussed  are best  viewed  as examples  of market  failure,  in which
industrial  firms  fail  to internalize  the  full  social  cost  of their
productive  activity or the operators  of motor vehicles fail to
internalize  the  social  cost  of  their  diesel  or  gasoline
consumption.  This dichotomy,  between pollution problems as a
failure in the provision  of public  infrastructures  for treatment
versus  pollution  as  market  failure,  will  be important  as  we discuss
fiscal reforms and  environmental  policies and  their  link to
environmental  degradation  and improvement.
XI.  The Foundations  of Enviroumental  Policy
In  this  section we  briefly discuss the  rationale  for
government  policies  toward  environmental  control and regulation,
and the role that the tax system can play.  The criteria of
economic  efficiency  and cost  minimization  are stressed,  although
possible  conflicts  with distributional  considerations  are noted.
11A. Rationale for Public Policies: Missing Markets
A market economy relies on price and profit signals to direct
resources  into  highly-valued  uses.  Firms  seeking  to  maximize
profit and consumers seeking to acquire  material well-being are all
led to achieve their ends at least cost to themselves.  While such
private cost-minimizing behavior is a social virtue when goods and
factors are priced to reflect their costs to society,  it results
in economic inefficiency and reduced social welfare if  markets are
missing and externalities are present.  In particular, it results
in  excessive pollution and environmental degradation.
Environmental quality can be considered an economic good and
the  degradation  of  the  environment  caused  by  other  economic
activities  can  be  considered  as  an  input  or  cost  into  those
activities.  Unlike  most commercial  goods, environmental quality is
naturally endowed rather than produced.  But the production and/or
consumption  of  other  commercial  goods  may  reduce  the  level  of
environmental  quality,  therefore  it is  in variable  supply  like
other goods.  For example, the supply clean air and water, which
are valued for their own sake, are used up by production processes
that dump waste products into the environment.
The  demand  for environmental quality comes  from people  who
wish to enjoy air and water which is clean and safe to breathe
12and drink.  Like any good,  the  willingness  to pay for more of it
declines as the amount  of it available  rises, and rises as the
ability to pay for it (household  income)  rises.  The supply of
environmental quality comes  from producers and  consumers of
pollution-generating  activities  who supply  more of it when they
reduce the level of polluting  activities  or when they purchase
equipment that reduces the amount  of pollution  caused at given
levels  of production.  The cost of providing  more environmental
quality is the net value of foregone  output (that is, value of
output  less  the  value  of  the  resources  released)  or  the  extra  costs
of the pollution  abatement  equipment,  respectively. Normally  we
expect that the marginal cost of "supplying"  an extra unit of
environmental  quality  to rise  as the amount  supplied  rises (i.e.,
as the amount  of pollution  abatement  rises). The "optimal"  level
of pollution  occurs  where  the marginal  willingness  to pay for an
increase in environmental  quality  is just equal to the marginal
cost of supplying  it.
Environmental  degradation  arises  as  an  economic  policy  problem
because  of a market  "failure"  or a "missing"  mar!  t.  There is no
way  for  demanders and  suppliers to  express their  relative
willingness to  pay  for, or  marginal willingess to  accept a
reduction  in,  the  quantity  of  environmental  quality.
Correspondingly,  there is no  price to  be paid  by  firms and
consumers  who degrade  environmental  quality  by their activities.
Polluters  treat  the  degrading of  environmental quality  as
13practically costless to themselves and ignore the costs they impose
on others.  When an input is free, a cost-minimizing producer wants
to use a lot of it, so excessive environmental  degradation results.
But the degradation of the environment is not free to the economy
as a whole.  Rather, high social costs are imposed on the economy
in terms  of reduced recreational opportunities, health  hazards,
reduced productivity of workers, general unpleasantness of day-to-
day life, etc.
Why does  a market  for environmental quality not exist like
those for other goods?  The reasons have to do with the absence of
private property rights and the fact that environmental quality is
a  public  (i.e, non-rival) good.  In order  for something  to  be
priced  by the market,  it is necessary to have  a legal right  to
control its use.  The environment is owned by everyone and hence by
no one.  A  "common property"  cannot  be priced  for  its use  and
therefore there is competitive overuse. 5
Coase  (1960)  pointed  out  that  such  overuse  is  not  an
inevitable  outcome.  In  principle,  the  demanders  of  higher
environmental quality should  be willing to find some way to "bribe"
polluters to reduce the level of pollution to the efficient level.
This doesn't happen because environmental quality is also a non-
rival  or  public  good.  Clean  air purchased  for  oneself  yields
benefits to everyone, but there is no way the purchaser can charge
for  the  benefits  he  provides  to  others.  Moreover,  since  the
14marginal cost of an extra consumer  of environmental  quality is
zero, it would not be optimal  to charge  a price even if it were
possible.  As a result,  no individual  has much incentive  to pay
polluters  to reduce  their  pollution. Collective  action  is needed
to prevent free-riding.
B. The Role  of Government  Policies
The above  suggests  the rationale  for  government  policy. One
possibility is to force payments by the people who enjoy the
increased  environmental  quality. In this  case  a tax is placed  on
everyone in the economy and the proceeds are used to pay the
polluters  to reduce  the level  of  pollution  they  cause. This is  an
"consumers  pay"  policy.
coase's  proposition  suggests  another  possibility. According
to Coase,  it doesn't  matter  whether  the  property  rights  are given
to the  polluters  or to the  consumers  of environmental  quality.  In
the latter case the consumers  can demand compensation  from the
would-be  polluters. When  environmental  quality  is very high,  the
amount  polluters  would  be  willing to  pay  to  degrade  the
environmental  by some amou..nt  is more than the people need to
receive (their  marginal  willingness  to  accept)  in  order  to tolerate
some  amount  of degradation. Thus  polluters  are  willing  to pay for
and households  are willing  to accept  some level  of environmental
degradation. This is  the "polluters  pay"  scenario.
15This  outcome  can be achieved  if the government  charges  an
emissions  fee  to  producers  for  polluting  the  environment.
Alternatively it could regulate the level of pollution that firms
can do.  Both of these are "polluters  pay" policies.  With lump-sum
taxation, either a "consumers pay" or a "polluters pay" policy can
achieve  the  economically  efficient  level  of  pollution
(environmental quality).  The two types of policies differ in terms
of their distributional impact,  their administrative ease, and the
revenue implications for the public sector.
C. Pigouvian Taxes for Environmental Control
As described  above, pollution  levels are  excessive because
polluters do not bear the full social cost of their actions.  Over
seventy years ago, A. C. Pigou suggested that the government should
impose taxes on activities that involve external social costs and
provide  subsidies  for  activities  that  confer  external  social
benefits.  "External" denotes costs  and benefits which  are  not
incorporated  into  the  market  prices  faced  by  private  economic
decision-makers.
Consider  the  act  of  consuming  a  gallon  of  gasoline  which
entails  an  external  cost.  If  the  gasoline  market  is  well
functioning in other respects, the consumer pays the full marginal
cost of production in the purchase price 6. But when the consumer
burns the gasoline in an automobile engine, another social cost is
16incurred which the consumer does not pay.  The combustion of the
gasoline  contributes,  albeit  slightly,  to  the  level  of  air
pollution in the area.  A small increment in air pollution in the
area of a  large population can have a finite  marginal cost because
air pollution is a "public" bad--that is, it is a bad incurred on
many people  in the community.  The consumer of gasoline  ignores
this part of marginal social cost when deciding whether to consume
an extra gallon of gasoline.
Because the  consumer does not pay the  full social  cost  of
burning gasoline, the activity appears cheaper than it really is.
The idea of the Pigouvian tax is to impose  a tax on gasoline equal
to that part of the marginal social cost which is not included in
the  production  price--the  external  marginal  cost.  The  tax-
inclusive price faced by the consumer is  then equal to the marginal
social cost of the product.  For example, if  the production cost of
gasoline  is a dollar per gallon and its combustion increases the
social cost of pollution by 10 cents,  then the marginal social cost
of a gallon of gasoline is $1.10.  The consumer pays only a dollar
per gallon in the absence of government policy, but with a 10 cent
Pigouvian tax the consumer  will perceive the socially correct price
of $1.107.
In the above example the Pigouvian tax achieves the outcome
that would have occurred if, somehow, the consumers of air quality
were  able to charge the gasoline consumers for the costs of the
17pollution. It is  not  necessary,  indeed  under  some  circumstances  it
is undesirables,  that  the  proceeds  of the  Pigouvian  tax be used  to
compensate consumers of the air quality for their loss.  The
revenue  collected  can  be added  to general  revenue  and used  to  make
overall  reductions  in tax  rates  or to purchase  public  goods.
The  separation  of  the  efficiency  and  distributional  impacts  of
correcting  pollution  levels  means  that  there  are alternative  ways
of imposing  the Pigouvian  tax.  For one, a general tax can be
imposed  on the population  with  the  revenue  used  to bribe  consumers
of gasoline to reduce their consumption.  In  this case. the
government  offers  consumers  (say)  a  ten  cent  per gallon  payment  to
reduce  their  gasoline  consumption.  Again  the  consumer  of gasoline
perceives  the  cost  of  consuming  gasoline  as $1.10--a  dollar  for  the
gasoline  plus the ten cent foregone  payment  from  the government. 9
Although  the incentive  to reduce  gasoline  consumption  provided  by
the  two policies  are  the  same,  they  differ  in  their  distributional
impact--in  the first  case  the  consumer  is  worse  off,  in the second
he is better  off.
While the concept of a Pigouvian  tax is simple, it may be
difficult  to implement  due to imperfect  information  and  monitoring
costs.  These  difficulties  are discussed  in detail  in subsequent
sections.  It is useful,  however,  to discuss  what the policy  can
accomplish  in abstraction  from  these  difficulties.
18Two efficiency  objectives  should  be achieved  in reducing  the
level  of pollution.  First,  a given  amount  of pollution  abatement
should  be accomplished  at least  social  cost.  This objective  is
sometimes  called  "cost  effectiveness".  It  should  be stressed  that
an improvement  in  the level  of  environmental  quality  will  be  costly
to  the  economy.  Other economic activities will have  to  be
curtailed and their value to society foregone,  or more costly
methods  of  production  or  consumption  must  be  used. An advantage  of
Pigouvian  taxes,  and other  "market  based  incentives",  is  that  they
automatically  achieve  the reduction  in pollution  at least  cost.
second it is desirable  that the right amount of pollution
abatement  be done.  Too  much  pollution  abatement  is undesirable  as
well  as  too little. Accomplishing  this  objective  requires  that  the
Pigouvian  tax  be set  at a  rate  such  that  the  economically  efficient
level  of pollution iLs  attained.  This is a more informationally-
demanding  objective  than  cost  effectiveness.
A third  objective  must  also  be  kept in  mind--the  distribution
of income  in the country.  Different  environmental  policies  have
different distributional  impacts and this may be an important
consideration.
We now examine in more detail  the policy  of Pigouvian  taxes
and its  ability  to achieve  the stated  objectives.
19i) Cost  Effectiveness
Continuing  the gasnoline  example,  suppose  that there are two
types  of gasoline  consuimers.  Type I, who commutes  to work from  a
location  not served  by public  transport,  finds  it very costly  to
reduce gasoline consumption  and would be willing to pay a high
price  to continue  using  gasoline  for  commuting  purposes. Type II
drives  mostly  for  pleasure  and  would  not  be  willing  to pay  a lot  to
continue using gasoline for this purpose.  Pollution  abatement
achieved by curtailing  type I's gae line consumption  has high
marginal  cost  while  the  abatement  achieved  by curtailing  type  II's
consumption  of gasoline  has low  marginal  cost.
If the  government mandates less use of  gasoline by  all
consumers,  say  in  equal  amounts  or  proportions,  pollution  abatement
would not be accomplished  at least  social  cost.  At the mandated
total  gasoline  consumption  level,  letting  type I consume  an extra
gallon and requiring  type II to reduce  by an extra gallon  would
leave  total  consumption  unchanged  but yields  social  cost savings.
The least  cost  method  of pollution  abatement  requires  that  the low
abatement  cost  consumers  reduce  gasoline  consumption  more  than  the
high abatement  cost consumers.  The least  cost abatement  policy
requires that each type of consumer  reduce his consumption  of
gasoline  until the marginal  cost  of abatement,  and therefore  the
marginal  willingness  to pay for  a gallon  of gasoline,  is equal  to
that  of every  other  type.
20To mandate  pollution  abatement  at the least  social  cost,  the
government  would  have  to know  the  marginal  abatement  cost for  each
type of consumer  and set  mandated  consumption  levels  accordingly.
The  advantage  of  the  Pigouvian tax  is  that  this  is  done
automatically.  The government  simply imposes a Pigouvian tax
sufficient to reduce total gasoline  consumption  to the desired
level.  The  consumers with high  costs of  reducing gasoline
consumption  will reduce  their  consumption  by a small  amount  with
the bulk of the reduction  coming  from  consumers  with low  costs  of
reducing  consumption. In this  way,  the reduction  is accomplished
at least social cost.10
ii) Economic  Efficiency
To accomplish  an efficient  level  of pollution  abatement,  the
Pigouvian  tax must be set so that  the tax-inclusive  price of the
activity  is equal  to its  total  marginal  social  cost.  Facing  this
market  price,  private  economic  decision  makers  will  undertake  the
activity  only if  the  marginal  benefits  are  at least  this  high,  and
are thereby  be led to make  efficient  choices.
There  are  many  difficulties  in  implementing  this  policy.  First
the external marginal  social  cost element  must be determined  so
that the Pigouvian  tax can be set equal to it.  Compounding  the
problem  is the fact  that  this  cost  element  may depend  on the level
of the activity  undertaken. For  example,  the  marginal  social  cost
21of  pollution  resulting  from  burning  an  extra  gallon  of  gasoline  may
be low when gasoline consumption  is low and high when gasoline
consumption  is high.  The simplest  cases  occur when  the external
cost  element  is invariant  to the  amount  consumed  and  the  Pigouvian
tax can be imposed at a rate which is fixed per unit of the
activity,  or when  the  external  cost  element  is  a constant  fraction
of the market  price so the Pigouvian  tax  can be imposed  at a rate
which is fixed  as a percentage  of  market  price. Either  case  would
be fortuitous.
In practice  the best alternative  is often to determine  the
level  of the  polluting  activity  which  is  the  most  desirable  and  set
the  tax to achieve  that  level. This  can  be  done  using  estimates  of
the elasticities  of market  supply  and  demand. If the  supply  curve
is  horizontal,  the appropriate  tax  rate  can be  determined  directly
from the price  elasticity  of market  demand.
The Pigouvian  tax is imposed  over  and above  any tax that is
imposed  for  revenue  purposes. For  example,  gasoline  may  already  be
taxed  as part  of a country's  value-added  tax. The  Pigouvian  tax is
added to this "revenue  tax".  A Pigouvian  subsidy  to an economic
activity  with a positive  externality  implies  a tax rate  below  the
going  revenue tax  rate.  The  tax  rate may  be,  but  is  not
necessarily,  less  than zero (i.e.,  a nominal  subsidy).
22iii)  The Distributional  Impact
A tax on a particular  economic  activity  will raise  the price
to the consumer and/or lower  the price to the producer.  These
price effects,  and subsequent  effects  in other  markets,  determine
the incidence  of the tax.  In the simplest  case where the supply
curve  is horizontal,  the  price  to the  consumer  rises  by the  amount
of the tax.  The relative  incidence  of this tax across  consumers
depends  on the income  elasticity  of  the  taxed  good. If  the good  is
income  inelastic  (elastic),  the budget  share  of the good rises  as
the income of the consumer falls (rises)  implying  that the tax
burden  is distributed  regressively  (progressively).
An important  problem  arises  if a  Pigouvian  tax falls  on goods
which have low income elasticity.  To the extent that the tax
increases the  price to  consumers, the  burden will  be  borne
disproportionately  by lower  income  groups.  A potential  conflict
exists in  this case  between environmental  and  distributional
policies.  We briefly  discuss  the importance  of this  conflict  and
possible  remedies.
One issue  is the  extent  to  which  low  income  elasticity  of the
taxed  good in fact  implies  regressivity. First,  as Poterba (1991)
shows in the case of gasoline,  consumption  may be inelastic  with
respect  to income  but  proportional  or even  elastic  with  respect  to
expenditure. Expenditure  increases  less  than  proportionally  with
23income so that, in principle,  all goods for present consumption
could  be income  inelastic. What  matters  is  whether  a good is  more
or less  income  elastic  than  the average. Poterba  argues  that  the
expenditure  elasticity  of a good may be a better criterion for
determining  whether  a tax is regressive. Also,  empirical  studies
indicate that  annual expenditure  tends to be proportional to
"permanent"  or lifetime  income,  which  may  be a better  indicator  of
ability  to pay than annual  income. Income  which is saved  will be
spent  by the household  3n the future  and does  not escape  taxation
altogether.  The burden of those future taxes is ignored when
judgements  concerning  the  progressivity/regressivity  of a tax are
based on how current spending  on the taxed good is related to
current  income. As an  alternative,  estimates  of lifetime  incidence
of  a  commodity  can  be  used,  although  these  are  not  readily
available,  particularly  for  developing  countries.
A  second consideration in determining  the  distributional
impact of a Pigouvian  tax is the distributional  impact of the
resulting improvement  in environmental  quality.  If low income
households  benefit  disproportionately  from  environmental
improvements,  then  a  Pigouvian  tax  on an income  inelastic  good  may
not be a regressive  policy  overall.  However,  the burden  of the
Pigouvian  taxes  can exceed  the  efficiency  gains  because  of the so-
called  "primary"  or revenue  burden  of the  tax.  As a result,  it is
unlikely  that  the  poor  will  be made  better  off from  high  Pigouvian
taxes  on  goods  with  very  low  income  (expenditure)  elasticities  even
24if they do gain disporportionately from the resulting improvements
in  environmental  quaity.  Of  course,  if  the  rich  benefit
disproportionately  from  environmental  improvement,  the
redistributional  impact is even more perverse.
The  distribution  of the benefits  of pollution  control  and
environmental  improvement may, in fact, disproportionately  favor
the poor  in developing  countries.  The poor currently have  less
dccess to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation than those
with higher  incomes  (Munasinghe, 1990).  The poor are also more
likely  to  suffer  from  indoor  air pollution  problems  (Krupnick,
1990).  To the extent that environmental policies  improve these
particular  pollution  conditions,  the  poor  ate  more  likely  to
benefit.  Eskeland and Jimenez (1991a)  note that the poor are more
likely to benefit from pollution control also because "they tend to
live in  poor health and sanitary conditions in  polluted urban areas
and  cannot  afford  to  protect  themselves  or  move"  (p.29-30).
However,  Eskeland and Jimenez also point out that some empirical
evidence  suggests  that the willingness  to pay  for environmental
improvement  among wealthier  individuals may be higher  than  that
among the poor,  and such differences could make the wealthy the
principal beneficiaries of environmental improvement.
Where  Pigouvian  taxes  do  lead  to  regressivity,  some
alternatives are available.  The first is to make a compensating
change in other components of the tax system.  For example, if the
25country levies a  personal income tax,  it  can  be  made  more
progressive, perhaps by giving an additional  tax credit to low
income  taxpayers. In  developing  countries  that  deper.d  on  commodity
taxation for revenue  purposes,  tax rates  can be reduced on basic
foodstuffs  or low-priced  clothing. This  may increase  the  costs  of
administering  the commodity  tax system,  however.
A second  alternative  is  to structure  the  policy  as a subsidy.
Rather  than  taxing  a  polluting  good  with  low-income  elasticity,  the
government should provide a subsidy for conserving it.  Thus,
instead  of taxing  home heating  fuel,  the  government  can subsidize
home insulation. Unfortunately,  rather  than  generating  government
tax revenue,  this type of policy  raises  the government's  revenue
needs.  These  are already  severe  in many  developing  countries.
A third  alternative  is  to ration  the available  consumption  of
the  negative-externality good  and  distribute  the  rations
disproportionately  toward  the poor.  This type of policy is very
unlikely  to achieve  pollution  abatement  at least  cost  unless  a  gray
market  in ration  coupons  is  permitted. If not,  the  distributional
effects  of the  tax instrument  would  have  to be  quite  adverse  before
the rationing  instrument  should  be considered.
26III. Po8sible Environmental Polioy Instruament
The  government  has  a  number  of  instruments  available  for
pursuing  policies  aimed at improving environmental quality.  In
this  section we describe  the set of instruments  from which  the
government  may  choose  and  in  the  next  section  we  discuss  the
criteria for selecting one instrument  over another and identify the
circumstances  in which the Pigouvian tax is the likely to be the
preferred instrument.
A. Assignment of Relevant Property Rights
In section II.A we argued that a major reason why there  is
excessive  pollution  in  the  first  place  is  that,  typically,
environmental quality is a common property resource.  Often there
are no private property rights  established for an environmental
resource  so  everyone  is  free to use  it.  When  the  use  of  the
resource by one individual reduces its availability to others, it
imposes costs on them but no price reflects this fact to the user
since ther is free access.
For example, suppose there are  many users who have free access
to a  lake.  Each  desires clean water  but in using the  lake he
reduces  its  cleanliness  for others.  With  many  users  and  free
access, no user has the incentive to maintain the cleanliness of
the  lake.  Suppose,  however,  that private  property  rights  are
27established  to the lake  allowing  the  owner,  in effect,  to sell  the
use of the water to the various  users.  The price for which the
water can be sold, and hence the profitability  to the owner,
depends  on its  cleanliness. In  this  case,  the  private  owner  has  an
incentive to  maintain  the  cleanliness of  the  lake  at  its
economically  efficient  level.
In  many cases  the  assignment  of  property  rights  is  not a very
good  instrument  to  accomplish  environmental  policy  objectives.  The
assignment  of  property  rights  could  create  a  monopoly,  or it  may  be
impossible  for  a private  owner  to monitor  the use of the resource
by others  and therefore  charge  the  appropriate  price.  Also,  many
environmental  assets  have  a "public  good"  quality  to them  so it is
not  be efficient  to charge  prices  for  enjoying  the  asset  in  some  of
its uses.  In these  cases  other  solutions  may be possible.
B. Marketable  Pollution  Quotas
A related idea is a policy  of marketable  pollution  quotas.
This policy may emerge naturally from a policy of regulation.
Under  a regulatory  policy,  firms  are limited  in  how  much  pollution
they  can  cause--for  example,  how  much  sulphur  dioxide  they  may  emit
into  the air or how much effluent  they can  dump into  a watershed.
Often these limits or pollution "quotas"  are the same for all
firms.  Typically, different firms have  different costs  of
pollution abatement.  As discussed  in the previous  section, the
28cost  of  pollution  abatement  is  not  minimized  if  firms  with
different  marginal  abatement costs  are required  to do the  same
amount of abatement.
Marketable  pollution  quotas  are a  method  of  ensuring  that
pollution  abatement  is done  at  least cost.  Keeping  the  total
amount of pollution permitted constant, the government can allow
firms to "sell" their pollution quotas to other firms.  Firms with
low marginal costs  of abatement are willinq to sell their quotas
and firms with high marginal costs of abatement are willing to buy
them at some intermediate price.  The pollution quota market is in
equilibrium when the price of a pollution quota is just equal to
the marginal cost of pollution abatement to all polluters.  In this
way the least cost pollution abatement is  obtained for a regulatory
policy,  as  in the  case  of  a  Pigouvian tax.  For  this  reason,
marketable pollution quota and Pigouvian taxes are lumped together
as  market-based  incentives  (MBIs).  In  fact,  except  for  the
distributional  impact  of  the  policies  and  the  fact  that  the
Pigouvian  tax  policy  raises  revenue,  the  two  policies  are
equivalent under perfect information.
A policy of marketable pollution quotas can be carried out at
different levels of formality.  The most informal policy is  simply
to let pollution quotas be traded within the firm.  In this case a
firm can increase the pollution emitted by one of its pLants if it
makes  a  compensating  or  more  than  compensating  reduction  in
29pollution emission by  another.  Alternatively,  the  firm may
increase  emissions  in one year if it decreases  them in another.
These informal  trading  arrangements  are incorporated  in policies
variously  referred to as offsets,  bubbles  and banking.  An even
more  market-oriented  approach  is  to allow  inter-firm  trading. This
can  range  from  informal trading among  firms to  a  formally
established  market  in  pollution  rights  like  that  recently  announced
by the Chicago  Board  of Trade  for sulphur  dioxide  emissions.
C. Indirect  Taxes  on Inputs  and Outputs
Rather  than  taxing  the  pollution-causing  activity  itself,  the
government  may levy excise taxes on outputs and inputs closely
associated  with the  pollution-causing  activity. This  approach  has
the advantage  that the government  may already have in place an
indirect  tax system on goods and services.  Thus environmental
policy  can  be  accomplished  simply  by  setting  the  existing  tax  rates
to incorporate  a Pigouvian  element.  Also, taxable outputs and
inputs usually are readily monitored  as part of raising public
revenue.  This policy  would be as good as taxing  the pollution-
causing  activity  if  the latter  occurs  in  fixed  proportions  with  the
taxable  output  or input.
One difficulty  is that  taxing  an output  or input  is that it
may be too blunt of an instrument.  In the gasoline example of
section  II,  an output  tax  on  gasoline  is  used  instead  of taxing  the
30pol.lution-causing  activity itself--the  burning of the gasoline.
Since  gasoline  is generally  purchased  only  to burn it, and if all
methods of burning  gasoline  contribute  equally  to air pollution,
the output  tax is almost  as good  of a policy  as taxing  the  burning
of gasoline. But suppose  gesoline  can  be used in  ways  that  do not
cause air  pollution?  A  gasoline tax would discourage these
socially  harmless  activities  as  well  as those  that  cause  pollution.
In the process of trying to correct one economic inefficiency,
another  would  be created.
In fact, it can be shown that a small  tax on gasoline  will
improve economic  efficiency  even if gasoline is used for other,
harmless  purposes. But the existence  of the harmless  uses limits
the  amount  of  welfare  improvement  that  can  be  attained  through  this
policy.  Taxing  output  is a "second-best"  policy  in that  there is
an additional  cost  element  to the  policy--the  cost  of discouraging
socially  harmless  uses of the output.  Whether  one has to settle
for  second-best  or  choose  another  instrument  can  only  be  determined
with further  analysis  and information.
A special example of this problem occurs  when pollution is
caused by consumption  of the output (say,  gasoline)  but can be
mitigated by the purchase of a  pollution-abating  input  (say,
catalytic  converters  for cleaner  burning).  Again an output  tax
will not accomplish  the least  cost method  of reducing  pollution.
The output tax by itself  provides  no incentive  to purchase the
31pollution-abating  inputs  even though  they may be the least-cost
method  of reducing  pollution. Similarly,  subsidizing  the abating
inputs  provides  no incentive  to  reduce  polluting  output,  in  fact  it
may increase  it.
The least  cost  method  of reducing  pollution  can be achieved,
however,  if an output  tax is imposed  on a polluting  firm and some
of the revenue  is used to subsidize  the  purchase  of the pollution
abating inputs.  This policy  would leave  unchanged  the relative
cost of reducing  pollution  by decreasing  output  or by increasing
abatement  inputs  since  the after-tax  price  of the output  and the
pollution-abating  are  reduce,  in  the  same  proportion.  This  ensures
that  an  efficient  means  of  reducing  pollution  is  chosen.
Alternatively,  as an approximation,  one could combine a tax on
output  with  regulatory  standards  (see  F  and  G below)  requiring  the
use of pollution  abatement  inputs. In the  gasoline  example,  a tax
on gasoline  could  be combined  with  a regulation  that  requires  that
cars  be equipped  with  catalytic  converters  or  requires  that  cars  be
subject  to emissions  tests  and fuel  carburation  adjustments.
D. Effluent  and Emissions  Charges
In  general,  in  the  absence  of  monitoring  and  other  information
costs,  the  best  policy  is  to  tax  the  activity  most  directly  related
to  the  pollution-causing  activity. This  requires  information  about
how  the  pollution comes about and  the  production technology
32available  to reduce  it.  It also  may  require  monitoring  and taxing
activities  which  are  not normally  taxed  for  revenue  purposes.
Where  the effluent  emitted  by the  polluter  can be monitored,
the  most direct  policy  is to impose  an effluent  fee.  For  example,
firms  dumping  waste  water into  a watershed  may be required  to pay
an effluent fee per unit dumped.  This is perhaps the closest
exaple of a  pure  Pigouvian  tax  there  is. Unfortunately,  there  are
perhaps  few  cases  where  such  a  policy  is  administratively  feasible.
E.  Content  Taxes.
In between excise  taxes on inputs  and outputs and taxes or
charges  on  the  polluting  effluents  or  emissions  themselves  are  what
might be called content taxes.  With this instrument,  a tax is
levied  on  the amount  of a  particular  component  in  a commodity. The
best  known  example  is the "carbon"  tax levied  by Finland  and some
other Scandinavian  countries  which tax the carbon contained in
fossil  fuels.  Other  examples  could  include  a "sulphur"  tax which
taxes fossil fuels according  to their sulphur content, or the
B.T.U.  tax (British  Thermal  Unit)  under  consideration  in  the  United
States  which taxes all energy  commodities  on the basis of their
heat content.
The  case of  the  carbon tax  is  illustrative.  The  main
pollutant here  is carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas, which is
33thought to be tke main contributing  factor to global warming.
Taxing the actual emissions  of carbon dioxide is difficult or
impossible  since they are not readily  monitored.  On the other
hand,  an  ad  valorem  (equal  percentage)  tax on all carbon-bearing
fuels  is less  than ideal  since  some  fuels  contain  much  more carbon
per unit of energy  than others.  For example,  a low carbon fuel
like  natural  gas would  be taxed  at the same  rate  as a l.igh  carbon
fuel like coal.  Rather,  if one desires  to reduce  carbon  dioxide
emissions,  it is bettter  to  target  the  tax  on the carbon  contained
in the fuel.  Thus a $5 a ton (say)  carbon  tax translates  into  a
13% tax on coal, which contains .605  tons of carbon per ton of
coal, and a 5% tax on natural  gas, which contains .207  tons of
carbon in a volume  which has the same  pre-tax  value as a ton of
coal.' 1
An  important consideration  in judging the  suitability  of
content taxes is appropriate  targeting.  A carbon tax is most
appropriate  in the case  where  the policy  maker is most concerned
with reducing carbon dioxide emissions  to slow global warming.
Although  such  a tax  may also  reduce  other  pollutants,  most  notably
carbon monoxide, it is not targeted specifically  at them and
therefore  may be a second  best  policy  if the other  pollutants  are
the  main  environmental  concern. For  example,  where  sulphur  dioxide
is a prime concern, the carbon tax provides no  incentive to
substitute  low  sulphur-content  coal  for  high  sulphur-content  coal,
34although  it  will  undoubtedly  lead  to  lower  sulphur  dioxide
emissions over all.1 2
Of course, content taxes can  be combined.  Thus, a sulphur tax
can be levied along with a carbon tax. The total tax on a unit of
fossil  fuel  will  then  depend  on  both  its  sulphur  and  carbon
contents.
F.  Emission  (Abatement) Standards
This is perhaps the most common environmental policy adopted.
In effect, it amounts to a non-marketable pollution quota.  Strict
limits are set on the quantity of emissions that a firm or economic
agent  can  produce  during  a  given  period.  Altwrnatively  and
equivalently a firm may be required to reduce its emissions by a
certain amount relative to what it has done in the past.
While  the firm is required to satisfy some standard on the
level of its emissions,,  typically the government does not control
or care about how  it accomplishes this objective.  The firm may
reduce  the  leve3l  of its economic activity or  install pollution
control equipment.  It is left up to the firm to choose the least
cost method.
35G. Abatement  Technology  Standards
With this policy the firm is required to install certain
pollution  abatement  equipment  or adopt  certain  abatement  methods.
That is, the government  specifies  the method  which the firm must
use to reduce its emissions,  unlike for the policy of emission
standards. While  such  a  policy  seems  to  obstruct  the  goal  of least
cost emission reductions,  it may be desirable if the level of
emissions  is  difficult  or costly  to monitor  whereas  confirming  the
use of the technology  standard  is not  (see  the discussion  in the
next section).  Also, as mentioned,  it may be a useful  policy in
conjunction  with output  taxes.
IV.  Criteria  for,Comparing  Policy  Iastrumeats
In  this  section we  introduce criteria  for  evaluating
alternative  policy  instruments  for  achieving  environmental
improvements  associated  with  pollution  control. Policy  instruments
differ in administrative  expense, level  of bureaucratic  control
over the actions  of polluters,  flexibility  afforded  polluters  in
abating  emission  levels,  requirements  for  monitoring  and  enforcing
compliance,  incentives  for  polluters  to engage  in  the research  and
development  of  new  pollution  abatement  technologies.  Lastly,  policy
instruments  for pollution  control  differ  in their  ability  to meet
other  fiscal  policy  objectives  of government.
36A.  Level  of  Control  by  Regulators  and  Flexibility  Offered  Polluters
Several of the policy instruments  previously  discussed in
Section III share  the property  that the environmental  regulatory
authority  directly  controls  the  quantity  of pollution  generated  by
particular firms  or  consumers  (e.g., emission  or  abatement
standards) or,  at  the very  least, the  aggregate quantity of
pollution generated  by an entire industry  or set of industries
(e.g.,  marketable pollution permits).  In some instances,  the
regulatory  authority  even  directly  controls  the  method  of  pollution
generation  and abatement (e.g.,  abatement  technology  standards,
mandated  input  mix for  particular  production  processes). Controls
on permissible  quantities  of pollution  or methods of pollution
generation and  abatement constitute the  most direct  form of
government  intervention  into  markets  with  environmental
externalities.  Mandating  emission  levels  and  abatement
technologies  gives  polluting  firms  little  flexibility  in  achieving
the abatement  targets.
By contrast,  several  of the policy  instruments  described  in
Section  III  affect  the  prices  firms  or  consumers  face  for  goods  and
services (e.g.,  indirect  taxes and content taxes), some policy
instruments  establish  prices for nonmarket  goods like pollution
(e.g.,  effluent  charges,  marketable  pollution  permits),  and  others
influence  the  cost  or  price  of  pollution  abatement  (e.g.,  abatement
subsidies). These  are  the  so called  "market  based  incentives"  for
37pollution control or the "price-type"  policy instruments.  They
allow polluting firms flexibility  when  implementing pollution
abatement strategies.  Market based incentives for  pollution
control  establish  artificial  prices  for  environmental  externalities
directly,  as in  the case  of effluent  charges,  or indirectly,  as in
the  case of  well-functioning  markets for  tradeable pollution
permits which establish  a market  price for a  unit of pollution.
Once prices for pollution  are established,  firms and consumers
determine the quantity of pollution (conversely,  abatement) to
generate.  Profit maximizing  firms facing a per unit effluent
charge will abate pollution as  long as the marginal cost of
abatement is less than the per unit price of generating the
effluent.  Profit maximizing firms will purchase permits (and
pollute)  as long  as the market  price  for a permit (on  a per unit
basis)  is  less  than  the  marginal  cost  of  abatement.  In  this
context,  the  cost  of abatement  includes  reductions  in  olitputs,  the
cost  of altering  the input  mix, as  well as the cost  of installing
and operating  the abatement  equipment.
The key  feature of market based incentives  or price-type
policy instruments  is that they delegate  control over decisions
about the relevant  quantities  to the self-interested  firms and
consumers.  Much of the subsequent  analysis  about the relative
desirability  of market  based  incentives  or price-type  instruments
versus  command-and-control  regulations  or  quantity-type  instruments
38focuses on the informational settings and circumstances under which
such delegation  is desirable or undesirable.
B. Monitoring and Enforcing Compliance
Regardless of the form of environmental regulation chosen by
the  policy  maker,  regulations  will  have  little  success  in
controlling the generation of pollution and its damaging effects if
compliance  with the  regulations is not adequately monitored  and
enforced.  Many environmental economists view enforcement as the
weakest  link  in  the  efforts  to  control  pollution.  Most
environmental  policy  instruments impose costs on polluters,  and
these  costs  can be avoided if polluters do not comply with  the
intent  of  the  environmental  policy.  To  circumvent  polluters'
incentives to not comply, regulators must implement monitoring and
enforcement procedures and strategies.
Nearly  every  form  of  environmental  regulation  entails  an
enforcement  burden.  Regulators  must  ensure  compliance  with
quantity-type  emission  standards  by  monitoring  and  punishing
violators.  If effluent charges are the regulation of choice, the
regulator  must  collect  the  appropriate  revenue.  If  abatement
technology  standards are employed, the regulator must check that
the appropriate equipment is installed  and is  subsequently operated
and maintained.
39The  best policy instrument  in a  given environmental and
industrial context may  depend critically on  the  associated
enforcement  considerations. Without considering  monitoring and
enforcement,  effluent  charges  may seem  the  most desirable  because
of  their  efficiency  properties  when  compared  with  inflexible
policy  instruments  such  as  uniform  abatement  technology  standards.
If, however,  it is nearly  impossible  to monitor  the discharge  of
effluent accurately, it will be impractical  and prohibitively
expensive  to collect  the effluent  fees  from,  and therefore  obtain
the  efficient level of  pollution abatement by,  the  targeted
industry. On the  other  hand,  it  may be  relatively  easy  to monitor
the installation  and  operation  of  mandated  abatement  technologies.
similarly, indirect taxes on polluting inputs and outputs, or
content  taxes,  may  be easier  to  collect  than  effluent  and  emissions
charges,  and  properly  designed  fiscal  reforms  may  be  more  efficient
than environmental  regulations.
C. Incentives  for Innovation  in Pollution  Abatement  Technology
Choosing  one policy  instrument  over  another  affects  not only
the  allocation of  resources and  the associated level of  net
benefits  enjoyed  by society  in  the  present,  but  also in  the future
by increasing  the incentive  for polluters  to invest  in newer and
cost-reducing abatement technologies.  In  the  presence of  a
pollution  tax the polluter  incurs  two types  of costs.  First,  the
costs of abatement  and, second,  the tax revenue  which is paid on
40units  of pollution  which  are  not abated. If  a polluter  can reduce
the marginal cost of abatement  by R&D investment,  he not only
enjoys  the savings  in abatement  costs,  he also  reduces  the amount
of pollution  taxes  paid  to the government  by increasing  the level
of abatement. Under  a pollution  tax,  the polluter  determines  the
level  of abatement  by equating  the marginal  cost of abatement  to
the  pollution  tax. Thus  the  incentive  to invest  in  abatement  cost-
saving technology includes  the tax savings from any additional
abatement  which becomes  worthwhile. The polluter  adopts  the new
technologies  if  the  present  value  of future  cost  savings,  including
savings  of pollution  taxes,  covers  their  R&D costs.
Contrast this to the case where the same polluter faces a
quantity-type regulation such as  an  emission standard.  The
polluter  initally  faces  the  cost  of complying  with  the  regulation,
which is the total cost of abating pollution  to the allowable
level. If, thereafter,  the  polluter  invests  in  measures  to reduce
abatement costs, the only return on the investment  is the cost
saving  of meeting  the  mandated  level  of abatement. In  particular,
the  polluter  does  not  have  the  incentive  of  cost  savings  achievable
by reducing  abatement  levels  below  those  mandated
Thus, we might expect less investment in more  efficient
methods  of pollution  abatement  by  polluters  who face  quantity-type
environmental  regulations  as compared  with  those  subject  to market
based  incentives  for  pollution  reduction.  These  differences  may  be
41even more pronounced  once the incentives  of the regulators  are
considered. If the  regulator  sets  a  pollution  tax so as to equate
the marginal  benefit  of abatement  with  its  marginal  cost,  then  the
best  policy response to a reduction in the marginal cost of
abatmement  is  to lower  the per unit  pollution  tax.  This lowers
the tax costs to the polluter  even further  and, if anticipated,
further increases  the polluter's  incentive  to invest  in reducing
abatement costs.  On  the  other hand, when  an  emission  (or
abatement)  standard  is used  and set so as to equate  the marginal
benefit  of  abatement  to its  marginal  cost,  the  best  policy  response
to a reduction  in  the  marginal  cost  of abatement  is  to tighten  the
abatement  standard. If  this  is  anticipated,  it  reduces  further  the
polluter's  incentive  to invest  in reducing  abatement  costs.
D. Fiscal  Policy  Objectives
This discussion  of the incentive  effects (for  R&D) of the
alternative policy  instruments does  not  mean  that  regulated
polluters prefer  market based incentives  like taxes to quantity
controls.  On the contrary,  the increased  incentive  for investing
in  new abatement  technology  under  a  pollution  tax  occurs  because  of
the revenue burden  associated  with the tax policy instrument,  a
burden  which is not  welcomed  by the polluters.
However,  the  revenue  generated  by pollution  taxes  may be very
welcome  to  the  government,  particularly  in  revenue-short  developing
42countries.  Pollution tax  revenue can  support programs  of
environmental improvement  or help achieve other fiscal policy
objectives.  In addition,  to the extent that the revenue from
pollution taxes  replaces revenue obtained from distortionary
taxes,  there  can be a further  efficiency  gain  over  the regulatory
instruments.
Environmental regulat:ions  seldom  can  be  considered  in
isolation of other government  policies.  Industries  subject to
environmental  regulation  may also  be subject  to other  tax/subsidy
policies designed to promote growth.  In the next section we
explore the  welfare implications  of alternative environmental
policy instruments  in greater  detail,  including  an examination  of
the  impact of environmental  regulations  where there are  pre-
existing  fiscal  policy  distortions.
V. Welfare  Analysis  of Environmental  Policy  Instruments
In this  section  we extend  the  analysis  of the  relative  merIts
of  different policy  instruments for  pollution control.  In
particular, we  consider in greater detail the  importance of
uncertainty,  asymmetric  information,  enforcement,  and  fiscal  policy
objectives.
43A.  The  Equivalence of  Different  Instruments with  Perfect
Information
In a world of certainty  and full  information,  the choice  of
one pollution  control  instrument  over  another  may, in fact,  be of
little  consequence. In  this  idealized  world,  quantity  instruments
suc,h - emissions  standards  and market  based instruments  such as
emissions  charges achieve  the same  objectives  at the same costs.
To achieve  efficiency,  the regulator  can set an effluent  tax, an
emission  standard, or  issue pollution permits--it makes  no
difference,  at least in the short run.  As long as the policy
instrument  effectively  equates  the marginal  benefit  of pollution
abatement to  the marginal cost, the  inefficiency due  to  the
pollution  externality  is eliminated.
As economist  Martin  Weitzman (1974)  forcefully  noted,  under
conditions  of full information  and perfect  certainty,  there is a
complete  equivalence  between  price-type  planning instruments  and
quantity types.  The regulator  can either mandate the optimum
quantity  directly  or induce  indirectly  the optimum  quantity  from
the self-interested  parties  by setting  the right  prices.
B. Comparative  Advantage  of Policy  Instruments  under  Uncertainty
Weitzman's seminal work illustrates  how  this equivalence
breaks down  in the more realistic context of uncertainty and
44asymmetric  information. Uncertainty  in the environmental  policy
context  may  result  from  several  sources. First,  it  may result  from
imprecise estimates of the levels  of pollution  damage and the
benefits  of  environmental improvement.  While  much  of  the
environmental  economics  literature  of the last  three decades  has
been devoted to the development  and improvement  of techniques
designed  to measure  pollution  damage  or elicit information  about
the willingness  to pay for environmental  improvements,  benefits
measurement  is still  inexact.
A  second  kind  of  uncertainty may  confront  regulators:
asymmetric information.  Asymmetric information describes a
situation where one party to a transaction  possesses relevant
private information that  the  other does not.  Environmental
regulators typically  have less information  about the abatement
capabilities  and costs than the polluting firms themselves  do.
Firms have a better  understanding  of the production  process and
therefore  better  information  about  the least  cost  way  of obtaining
a particular  level  of pollution  abatement.
Weitzman  considers  a situation  in which a regulator  chooses
between a price-type  instrument  and a quantity-type  instrument.
The  objective is to maximize the expected net  benefits  (the
difference between expected gross benefits and expected total
costs).  The policy instrument  must be chosen under conditions
where both types  of uncertainty  described  above  prevail:  that is,
45general  uncertainty  about  the  benefits  and asymmetric  information
about  abatement  costs.  The  important  question  in  choosing  between
these policy instruments  is the desirability  of delegating  the
decision  about  the quantity  of  abatement  to the firm,  a  delegation
which  occurs  under  the  price-type  instrument. The firm  has  better
information about costs; however, its self-interest  does  not
coincide  with the social  interest.
In particular,  let  gross  benefits  be the willingness  to pay
for  pollution abatement (and the  corresponding environmental
improvement),  and  let total costs be  the costs of pollution
abatement. To simplify,  assume  that  the  regulator  knows  the shape
and slope of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves of
abatement  (see Figures V.1  and  V.2), but  not  their heights
(vertical  intercepts).  Although  the  height  of  the  marginal  benefit
curve  is uncertain  to all  parties,  the  height  of the  marginal  cost
curve is known by the polluting  firm  but not the regulator. The
polluter  knows  the marginal  cost  of abatement  and, in the case of
a pollution  tax,  chooses  the level  of abatement  which  equates  the
marginal cost of abatement  to the pollution  tax.  On the other
hand, when  the  regulator mandates the  quantity of  abatement
directly, the  firm need simply comply with the mandate.  We
consider  later  the  possiblity  that  the  firm  can  choose  to comply  or
not.
46It  turns  out  that  the  comparative  advantage  or  disadvantage  cf
a  price-type  isntrument  over  a  quantity-type  instrument  depentl8
only on  the  relative  slopes  of the marginal  benefit  and marginall
cost of abatement curves and on the nature of the asymmetric
information  about costs.  Interestingly,  the decision about the
policy instrument  does not  depend  on the  more general  uncertaint)r
about the level  of benefits. Tho desirability  of delegating  thie
quantity  of abatement  choice  to the firm (by  using  the the price-
type instrument)  depends  on how  much  better  the firm's  information
about abatement  costs Is as compared  to the regulator.  If thle
price-instrument  is used,  the level  of abatement  which results  Is
not known with certainty  beforehand  by the regulator:  the firm
resolves  the uncertainty  when it chooses  its  abatement  level.  If
the quantity-instrument  is  used,  the  regulator  fixes  the quantity
of  abatement  (assuming  no compliance  and  enforcement  problems)  b1it
the cost of the abatement  is  uncertain.
A quantity  instrument  is  more  likely  to be  preferred  when the
marginal  cost  of abatement  rises  slowly  as the level  of abatement
rises and when the marginal  benefit of abatement  fallE£  sharply.
Under these conditions,  the costs imposed  by setting  tthe  "'wrong"
price due to the uncertainty  facing  the regulator  will be;  large
relative  to the costs imposed  by setting  the "wrong"  quantity of
abatement.  Thus, a price-type  instrument,  where the riesulting
level  of abatement  is  uncertain,  is less  desirable  than  a mandated
47,quatitity  of abatement  which achieves  the same expected level  of
a.bat:ement  (see  Figure  V.1)  but with  certainty.
On the other hand, if the marginal  cost of abatement  rises
steaply with the  level of abatement and the marginal benefit
chiinges  little,  the price instrument  will be preferred.  In this
casse,  setting  the "wrong"  quantity  of abatement  due to the limited
information  facing  the regulator  is more  serious  than setting  the
wrong price.  It is better  to set the price  on the basis of the
etxp,ected  marginal  benefits  and  marginal  costs  of  abatement,  and let
tlie  firms, who know the true marginal  cost of abatement  curve,
choose  the level  of abatement  (see  Figure  V.2).
In  practical  terms,  this  analysis  suggests  that  in cases  such
as toxic waste  disposal,  where  a little  toxic  waste  may be all  that
is needed  to  have drastic and dire effects on  environmental
quality,  the  government  is  best  off  relying  on  quantity
restrictions.  Using  a price  instrument  and relying  on the firms'
superic)r  kncowledge  risks  the  possibility  that  the  marginal  cost  of
abatemeiit  iEi  high to the firms and they will follow their self-
interest andi  produce  too little  abatement  of an activity  with a
very high social  cost.
On thot  other  hand,  in  the  case  where  firms generate  non-toxic
air  polluitants which  degrade  the  environment by  lowering
visibility, it may be advantageous  for the government  to use a
48price  or market-based  instrument.  The  marginal  benefit  of abati.ng
this type  of pollution is not  likely to change much as  the
quantity  of  abatement  changes. But if  the  firms  have  heterogeneolas
costs  of  abatement,  it  might  be  wise  for  regulators  to set  effluent
taxes  and let each  firm,  which  possesses  better  information  about
its own costs,  decide  the level  of abatement.  The cost saving-s
from firms choosing minimum cost abatement levels is likely tc>
outweigh  the  costs  of  having  the  "wrong"  overall  level  of  abatement:
due to regulator's  uncertainty.
C. Enforcement  Considerations
Another  practical  consideration  facing  regulators  is  the fact
that the polluting  agents  may not comply  with regulations. Just
because a regulator forbids  emissions  beyond  a particular  level
does  not  guarantee  that  polluters  will  not  continue  to exceed  those
limits.  Similarly,  just because  a regulator  establishes  a price
for  pollution  by  setting  an  effluent  charge  does  not  guarantee  that
firms will honestly report  their discharges  and pay the correct
fees.  And if the firms don't pay the fees they won't have an
incentive  to choose  the optimal  level  of pollution  abatement.
There is  anecdotal  evidence  of  noncompliance  with  technology
based standards  even in the United  States  where institutions  are
well developed.  While it is fairly  easy to check that mandated
abatement  equipment  has been  installed,  if  operating  the  equipment
49ii costly, firms  may circumvent  the regulation  by "unhooking"  the
equipment  when regulators  are not looking.
We discuss below the implications  of costly  monitoring  and
eBnforcement  for  the  case  where  regulators  set  emission  or  abatement
istandards. Much of what  we have  to say applies  with equal force
1io  price-type  policy instruments. The analysis  is based on the
sconomics-of-crime  analysis  of Becker (1968). Becker  argued  that
"r4tional" criminals  will commit crimes as long as the private
maz!ginal  benefit  of the crimes  exceeds  the expected  marginal  ctst
of committing  the crimes." 3 Similarly,  when deciding whether to
comply with an environmental  regulation,  firms will compare the
cos8t  of compliance  with the expected  value  of the consequences  of
none:ompliance.
Denote  the  probability of  detection and  prosecution of
noncompliance as p  (determined  by the enforcement budget and
strategy  of the regulator)  and suppose  further  that, if found  in
violation  of an emission  standard,  the firm  must  pay a fine  F  and
comply  with the standard  incurring  abatement  costs  of C.  A risk-
neutral  firm will  choose to comply  if C <  p(F +  C) or  if  C <
(pF/(1-p)). This simple  model  of firm  behavior  suggests  that the
lower  the costs  of compliance,  the greater  the chance  that  a firm
will comply. It also  suggests  that  where  firms  have  heterogeneous
costrs,  some will  comply while others, which have  the  higher
50abatement  costs,  will  not.  Finally,  compliance  is  more likely  the
greater  is  the  probability  of  detection  and  the  larger  is  the  fine.
Interestingly,  enforcement  considerations  affect  the  standard-
setting process.  Viscusi and Zeckhauser  (1979)  point out that
tightening standards (i.e.,  requiring  more abatement)  may have
perverse  consequences. Suppose  a regulated  industry,  where firms
have different abatement costs, is confronted with a  uniform
abatement  standard  per  firm. If  enforcement  is  costly,  so  that  the
probability  of detecting  violations  is less  than one, firms  with
high abatement  costs may choose  not to comply  with the standard
while  other  firms,  with  lower  abatement  costs,  do.  This  determines
the  aggregate level of pollution abatement obtained.  If the
standard  is  tightened by  increasing the  required amount of
abatement  per firm, then abatement  will rise to the extent  that
firms who complied  with the less stringent  standard  continue  to
comply.  However, some of the firms  who complied  with the less
stringent  standard  will find it in their interest  not to comply
with the more stringent standard.  For these firms,  who have
intermediate  levels  of abatement  cost,  the cost of complying  with
the new standard  is too great,  so they  will now cheat  and their
abatement  will  fall. The  non-complying  firms  will  continue  not to
comply.  If  the increase  in  pollution  from  the  second  group  of firms
is  greater  than  the  decrease  from  the  first,  pollution  may rise  as
standards  are tightened.
51While  this  perverse  outcome  from  tightening  pollution
standards  is not always  the rule, it is a fairly  general result
that the optimal pollution  standards  are less stringent in the
presence  of imperfect  monitoring  and  costly  enforcement  than  in  the
idealized  world of perfect  monitoring  and costless  enforcement.
An important  implication  is that the level  of environmental
quality depends on the level of compliance  with environmental
regulations  in  practice,  and not on how "tough"  the environmental
standards  are in statutes. Unfortunately,  as reported  by Eskeland
and  Jimenez  (1991b), monitoring, enforcement, and  regulatory
capacities  have been  weak in developing  countries  (p.16):
In  Mexico,  for  instance,  the  influence  of  regulations  has  been
limited  by  the  resources  of  the  enforcement  agency  and  the low
level  of fines. In Columbia,  laws  have included  formulas  for
calculating  a  tax  on  discharges  to  water,  but  no  apparatus  has
been in place to monitor and bill polluters.  In India,
inefficient  legal processes have reduced the disincentive
effects  of lawsuits  against  polluters.
Indeed, enforcement efforts have been weak  in some developed
countries as  well.  Magat, Krupnick, and  Harrington  (1986)
conductimd  a  study of regulatory  effort to enforce safety and
environmental  regulations  in the United  States  during  the 1970's
and  early  1980's  and  found  that  the  resources devoted  to
enforcement  were inadequate.
Several  economists  have  emphasized  recently  the importance  of
targeting  current  monitoring  and  erforcement  efforts  and  resources
on particular  firms  chosen  on the basis  of 'heir  past compliance
52records." 4 Monitoring firms with a record of previous violation of
environmental regulations more frequently than firms with no such
record is found to lower the enforcement costs of obtaining a given
aggregate  level of compliance from the regulated industry.  That
is, costs are lower when past performance is used as a factor in
targeting  enforcement  expenditures  than  when  all  firms  are
monitored  with  the  same  frequency  regardless  of  their  past
performance.  This  feature  of  optimal  enforcement  practice
emphasizes  the  importance  of accurate  record  keeping  regarding
(non)  compliance.
D.  Constraints on Environmental Policy in Developing Countries
There  are  a  number  of  differences  between  developing  and
developed  countries  that  should  be  considered  when  setting
enviLonmental policy in the former.  Among these differences are
the facts that in developing countries per capita income is much
lower, access to quality medical care is lower, the baseline level
of pollution control is lower, the capital base is often older and
not  as well  maintained,  institutions in charge  of administering
fiscal  reforms  and  promulgating  and  enforcing  environmental
policies are generally weaker  (among other things this means the
expertise, funds, and technology for data collection and monitoring
are often  lacking), and the demand on the public  sector for the
provision of public goods is  greater while the revenue base is much
narrower.
53From  this  list  we emphasize  low  per  capita  income  and  the lack
of medical care for much of the developing  world's population.
These  are important  determinants  of the level  of  pollution  control
or abatement  that is beneficial  and cost  effective. In developed
countries,  there is evidence  that the demand for environmental
quality depends positively on  income--that is,  environmental
quality is a  normal good.  Although estimates of the  income
elasticity for  environmental  quality from developed countries
should  not be used  as precise  estimates  for their  counterparts  in
developing  countries,  it is likely  to be the case  that the demand
for environmental  quality in developing  countries  will rise as
their  economies  grow.
In  the  initial stages of  growth, perhaps only  modest
reductions  in  optimal  level  of  pollution  are  warranted  on  the  basis
of the income  elasticity  of environmental  quality.  However,  the
existing levels of pollution  presently  suffered  by residents  of
Mexico City, Calcutta,  Cairo, Beijing, or Warsaw are far from
optimal. Up until  now,  very  little  pollution  control  measures  have
been  employed  in the  developing  world,  and even  modest  reductions
in pollution  emissions  or modest  improvements  in the treatment  of
polluted water could produce large  gains in the welfare of the
general  population.  In addition,  with so much of the population
lacking  adequate  medical  care,  modest  improvements  in  environmental
quality  may represent  one of the least  cost  methods  of improving
health  in developing  countries.
54The  differences  between developing and developed  economies
also  are  relevant  to  the  question  of  instrument  choice--in
particular  the  relative  desirability  of  marketable  pollution
permits  versus  regulations  or  pollution  taxes.  In  developed
countries, one can argue that marketable pollution permits may be
a  very attractive alternative  to command  and control regulations or
to  indirect  (and  distortionary)  taxes  designed  to  curtail
pollution.  First, the formal market economy is comprehensive and
well  established,  so there  is reason  to believe that  pollution
permits will  be traded among firms with heterogeneous  pollution
abatement costs.1 5 Second, by establishing a price for pollution
(the  price of a  permit), profit-maximizing firms  with heterogeneous
abatement costs should equate the marginal cost of abatement with
the price of pollution.  Equating the marginal cost of abatement
across  firms of all cost types is a necessary condition for cost
effectiveness in  an environmental  regulation.  Third, environmental
regulatory  agencies  have  existed  for over  two  decades  in most
developed countries, and monitoring and enforcement practices are
well  established,  so  it is expected that  firms  in a  developed
country are more likely to comply with the pollution restrictions
inherent in the permit system.16
In contrast, in  developing countries the formal  market economy
is not as comprehensive, so there is reason to question whether a
market  for  pollution  quotas  would  match  buyers  and  sellers
efficiently.  Furthermore, with a system of pollution quotas, the
55regulatory  authority  must  monitor  the  quantity  of  pollution  emitted
at each source (and  account  for the changing  pollution  rights  of
individual  firms  as  tLades  of  quotas  occur). If  meager  enforcement
budgets and a lack of technological  expertise  preclude  effective
monitoring, the  supposed efficiency properties of  marketable
pollution  permits  will not be realized.
E. The Efficiency  Value  of Environmental  Taxation  in
Developing  Countries
Other  facts about environmental  regulation in developing
countries  (viz.,  the  lack  of  administrative expertise  in
environmental  policymaking,  general  weakness  of  legal  institutions,
and  potentially  small  enforcement  budgets)  enhance  the  desirability
of  using environmental  policy instruments  which are similar in
structure  to existing  fiscal  instruments. These  are instruments
with  which  developing  countries  have  administrative  experience,  and
which minimize  enforcement  requirements. As a first  step toward
curbing  pollution, developing countries should  reduce  their
sizeable  energy  subsidies  to highly  polluting  industries. Kosmo
(1989)  notes that governments  in many developing  countries  keep
energy prices at  levels well below the world prices.  These
subsidies  result  in  excessive  energy-related  emission  of  pollutants
in the industries  relying  on subsidized  energy  as an input.
A second  step  in reducing  industrial  pollution  in  the energy-
consuming  sectors  is  to tax  energy  inputs,  in  addition  to removing
56the subsidies.  A tax on energy inputs is likely to have lower
enforcement  costs than alternative  regulatory  approaches.  For
example, an environmental  tax on polluting  inputs  requires less
monitoring  than levying  an emissions  tax  or enforcing  an emissions
standard.  Purchases of  important inputs to production, like
energy, should be relatively  easy to document.  Of course, as
Krupnick  (1990)  notes,  "such  an  approach  only  provides  incentive  to
reduce  purchase  of the input,  not necessarily  to find the least-
cost means of reducing  pollution  and, if the input  is not chosen
with  a careful  eye  towards  substitutes,  there  is no guarantee  that
emissions  will  fall. Nevertheless,  on  balance,  this  approach  seems
to  be a reasonable  second-best  policy" (p.34).
The  second-best  policy of taxing polluting inputs (e.g.,
energy, leaded  gasoline,  pesticides)  is  particularly  appealing  in
developing countries because it draws upon the  administrative
capability  most  of  them  possess  from  levying  commodity  taxes. Most
developing  countries do  not  have  extensive experience with
administering  and  enforcing  other  forms  of  environmental
regulation. Assistance  from  international  agencies  and academics
is changing  this,  but the  change  is  slow.  The lack  of government
expertise, record keeping  capability, and  enforcement funds
probably  rule  out,  for  the  present, the  more  sophisticated
regulatory  schemes being tried in parts of the developed  world
(e.g.,  X  r'ketable  pollution  permits).
57The use of environmental  taxes,  whether  on polluting  inputs
and outputs, content taxes, or emissions  fees, have the added
appeal that they generate revenue, unlike emission standards,
abatement  technology  standards,  or chemical  bans  which  collect  no
revenue  and are costly  to enforce. By the same logic,  pollution
taxes are superior  to abatement  subsidies.  The former  generate
revenue,  and  the  latter  add  to  the  government's revenue
requirments.  Public  sector  budgets  in  many  developing  countries  are
severely limited, and  raising additional revenue through the
existing  tax structures  can  involve  large  inefficiencies  because
the  tax  bases are  typically quite narrow and  taxation badly
distorts resource allocation decisions.  To  the  extent that
environmental  tax revenues replace those obtained through more
distortionary means,  environmental taxes  have  an  additional
"efficiency  value". As Terkla (1984)  explains,  "it is defined  as
the reduction  in excess  burden  resulting  from  the substitution  of
these revenues for current and future resource distorting tax
revenues"  (p.107).
Terkla  calculates  the  efficiency  value  of  potential
particulate emissions and sulphur dioxide taxes on stationary
sources  in the United  States  and finds  that the estimated  values
range  from  a possible  value  of  US$0.63  to  US$4.87  billion  (in  1982
dollars),  depending  on the  wide  range  of plausible  abatement  cost
levels  and on whether  environmental  tax revenue  replaces  labor  or
corporate  income  tax revenue. His working  assumption  is that the
58taxes  would  be set so as  to achieve  national  air  quality  standards
for  sulphur  oxides  and  particulates  based  on  the  U.S.  Environmental
Protection  Agency  emission  standards  for  new sources. Terkla  uses
the mid-seventies  estimate  from  the public  finance literature  of
$0.35  for  the  marginal  welfare  cost  of  a  dollar  of labor  income  tax
revenue.  For  the marginal welfare cost of  corporate income
taxation,  he takes $0.56  per dollar  from  Feldstein's  (1978)  two-
period life cycle  model.  The estimates  of marginal  welfare loss
are  consistent with  figures generated more  recently from  a
computable  general  equilibrium  model  of  Ballard,  Shoven,  and  Walley
(1985).
Terkla's argument is  important since so many  developing
countries  currently  raise  revenue  from  a  very  narrow  tax  base  with
highly  distortionary  commodity  taxes (The  World  Bank,  1990).  The
efficiency  value  of pollution  taxes  is  best  viewed  as an  element  in
the instrument  choice  debate. The argument  is relevant  whether  or
not the polluting  inputs  and outputs  are already  taxed  as part of
the country's revenue base.  Suppose all taxable goods in the
economy  are initially  taxed  (for  revenue-raising  purposes  only)  so
that the  marginal excess burden  (exclusive  of the  impact on
environmental  quality)  is  the  same  across  taxable  commodities. If
good  X is  a particularly  polluting  commodity,  either  in its  use as
an input  to production  or through  its  consumption  as a final  good,
its use can be curbed in two ways: a quantity restriction  on
polluting  emissions  or an increase  in the per unit tax levied  on
59the  good.  Notwithstanding  differences in  administrative or
enforcement burden, the  commodity tax  approach is preferable
because  of its  additional  value  in raising  revenue.
One way to demonstrate  this is to note that an emissions
standard,  which limits  the quantity  of the polluting  good X sold,
creates an economic rent  (the difference  between the marginal
willingness  to pay (price]  and the marginal  cost (including  the
baseline  commodity  tax]  of  production)--a  rent  which  would  be  taxed
away  if  the  revenue  structure  is  optimized  since  taxes  on  rents  are
lump-sum  (i.e.  non-distortionary)  taxes. Increasing  the  tax  on the
polluting  good  so as to achieve  the same  level  of use as under  the
standard achieves the  goal of the  environmental  policy  and
captures the economic rent as a low cost source of government
revenue.
Even if  environmental  tax  revenues  are  not  used  to reduce  the
revenues raised from other distortionary  taxes, they provide an
additional  efficiency  value  relative  to  other  forms  of
environmental  regulation  if the revenue  is used  to finance  public
infrastructure  projects  which  generate  large  net benefits. Water
treatment plants and  improved sanitation facilities are  good
examples  of the types  of projects  that could  be financed  through
environmental  taxes and user charges.  They hold the promise  of
generating  large  environmental  benefits,  given  the  current  state  of
water  pollution  problems  in  most developing  countries.
60F.  Environmental  Regulation  and Pre-Existing  Market  Distortions
In  developing  (and  developed) economies,  environmental
policies  are  formulated  in  the  presence  of  existing  fiscal  policies
aimed to raise revenue  and to encourage  targeted  industries. In
this section we analyze the relationship  between environmental
regulations  and pre-existing  fiscal  policies.
We begin by considering  an existing tax/subsidy  structure
which is clearly  suboptimal. This is,  unfortunately,  the case in
many  developing countries where energy-consuming  sectors are
heavily  subsidized  while  other  sectors  face  substantial  commodity
taxes.  In this situation,  what are the welfare effects of an
environmental regulation which curtails output  in  a  heavily
subsidized  sector? The social  costs (benefits)  of the regulation
are usually less (greater)  than  they  would  been if the sector  was
not subsidized. An example  from  the United  States  clarifies  this
point further.
Lichtenberg  and Zilberman  (1986)  study the desirability  of
pesticide  bans  for  agricultural  crops  which  are  heavily  subsidized
for  political  or  distributional  reasons.  The  crops  under
consideration  receive  substantial  subsidies  in the form  of output
price  supports. These  supports  encourage  an overproduction  of the
commodities  in  question  (corn,  rice,  and  cotton). Banning  certain
harmful pesticides not  only generates desirable environmental
61benefits, but welfare may be further enhanced because the ban
reduces  the output  of the  overproduced  commodities. This  argument
is  relevant  in  many  developing  country  where  subsidies  have led  to
an undesirable  expansion  of some outputs (Kosmo,  1989)."  on the
other  hand,  stringent  environment,  regulations  which  reduce  output
in sectors  which are already hampered by high rates of commodity
taxation can be very costly  in welfare terms. In this case,
stringent  environmental  regulations  are only warranted  where the
pollutant  is extremely  damaging.
While the existence  of a polluting  output  or input  which is
subsidized  or taxed  too  little  is  a  particularly  attractive  target
for a Pigouvian  tax, it should  be remembered  that commodity  tax
rates  can  vary  for  sound  fiscal  reasons  and  these  variations  do not
identify  an extra  efficiency  reason  for imposing  a Pigouvian  tax.
Conversely, the  presence of  pre-existing high  tax  rates  on
polluting  goods does not eliminate  the argument for taxing  them
even  more  for  environmental  reasons. If  the  pre-existing  tax  rates
are chosen  as quasi-optimal--that  is, optimal  for fiscal  reasons
but without regard to the environmental  impacts--they  can and
should  be  increased  further  if  the  goods  cause  external
environmental  costs.  That  is,  the Pigouvian  tax on a good should
be added  to whatever  tax  rate  is  appropriate  for  revenue  purposes.
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We  have  emph.asized  the  usefulness  of  eliminating  subsidies  and
increasing  taxes  on polluting  inputs  and outputs  as an important
first  step  in  reducing the  pollution problems prevalent in
developing  countries  today. In  addition,  governments  of  developing
countries  can  consider  content  taxes  such  as taxes  on the sulphur,
carbon and lead content.  of fossil  fuel<.  Such taxes are more
finely  focused  on the  offer.Jing  agents  of pollution. Beyond  this,
it  is  difficult  to  make  specific  recommendations about
environmental policies  which  would  be  appropriate for  all
developing  countries  given  differences  in the structures  of their
economies  and  the  particular pollution problems  they  face.
However,  most  developing  countries  are  confronted  with  the  emerging
problems  of air  pollution  from  vehicular  sources  and  the  industrial
and domestic  use of coal as a fuel.  Also,  nearly  all developing
countries  are plagued  with the contamination  of water resources
with raw sewage,  agricultural  runoff,  and some industrial  point-
source  pollution. For  these  problems,  we offer  a few  suggestions.
Concerning  air pollution  problems in developing  countries,
Krupnick  (1990)  contends  that  the  efficiency  case  for  market-based
incentives  is particularly  strong and that a limited system of
emission fees, along with price reforms  on subsidized  polluting
production inputs,  are attractive  approaches  for the control of
urban  air pollution  from industrial  sources. For  health  reasons,
63it  is imperative  that developing  countries  phase out the use of
leaded gasoline.  In  countries with state-owned  refineries  this
could  be accomplished  by fiat  or by setting  a high  price  on leaded
gasoline.  In countries  with  private  refineries,  regulations and
hefty taxes on leaded  gasoline  would accomplish  the same thing.
More generally,  controlling  present  and  future  vehicular  emissions
with  increased  fuel  taxes  is  likely  to  be  a  very  sound  policy,  both
as a revenue-raising  device and as an effective  and least cost
means of discouraging  this increasingly  important  source  of urban
air pollution.  In the  case of mobile  source  air pollution,  fuel
taxes should be supplemented  with programs aimed at improving
vehicle  maintenance. Krupnick  continues  (p.43):
...  buses and trucks are such an important transport mode  in
developing  countries  and,  with  some  exceptions,  these  vehicles
are  old  and  poorly  maintained,  more  attention  needs  to  be paid
to their emissions  than now (where  emissions  are generally
ignored).  Performance  standards  and  inspection  and
maintenance  programs  specifically  directed  to these  types  of
vehicles  are  needed.  Such  monitoring and  enforcement
requirements  are likely  to result  in inexpensive  carburation
and other  adjustments  that  would  yield  substantial  emissions
reductions.  Automobiles  and  two-wheeled  vehicles  also  need  to
come  under  these  programs.
The periodic  monitoring  of emissions,  while costly,  may still  be
economically efficient.  A  fuel  tax  is  broader  than  the
theoretically  desirable  tax  on individual  emissions. Therefore,  a
fuel tax by itself,  with no monitoring  of actual  emissions,  will
not induce the optimal abatement  of emissions  per unit of fuel
consumed.
64Another important source of  air pollution in developing
countries is that of indoor  heating and cooking.  Smith (1988)
documents  that  in  several  developing  countries,  coal  burning  stoves
are a major problem  and that subsidizing  improved  cooking stoves
for the poor may yield large benefits and be relatively  cost-
effective  (compared  to the costs  of abating  comparable  quantities
of the same pollutants  generated  by industrial  sources).  The
emission of sulphur dioxide, from both industrial  and domestic
sources burning coal, might best be controlled  by taxing high-
sulphur  content  coal at a much higher  rate  than low-sulphur  coal.
The  regulation  of sulphur  content  in fuels  has  worked  well in  many
developed  countries  (OECD,  1991).
In the case of water  pollution,  a mix of policy instruments
designed to  curtail pollution is needed, in addition to the
publicly  financed  expansion  of  treatment  and  sanitation  facilities.
To partially  finance  the expansion  of water  treatment  plants,  the
water  authorities  in  developing  countries  should  institute  a  system
of user charges for those municipalities  and industrial  sources
whose  effluent  is  to be treated. User  charges  like  these  have  been
employed  successfully  in  Germany. Large  industrial  polluters  whose
water effluent can be easily identified  and measured could be
charged  a per unit effluent  fee.  Most agriculturally-based  water
pollution  problems  are  of a  nonpoint  nature,  and  monitoring  runoff
is impractical.  Consequently,  input  taxes (on  manure, chemical
65fertilizers, pesticides, and  irrigation water)  are  the  most
practical  and  reasonably  efficient  policy  instruments  available.
We have argued  the case  for indirect  commodity  taxation  as a
useful  instrument  for  controlling  many  of  the  pollution  problems  in
developing countries.  This  case  is  based  on  the  limited
administrative  expertise in environmental  policymaking,  general
weakness  of legal  institutions,  and  potentially  small  enforcement
budgets  found  in many developing  countries. However,  for certain
classes  of pollutants,  strict  command  and control  regulations  are
warranted. Toxic  pollutants  should  not  be controlled  with  market-
based  incentives  like  emission  fees  or indirect  commodity  taxes  on
inputs.  In these  circumstances,  where  the  marginal  damage  from  a
pollutant  depends  critically  on the  quantity  emitted,  the  quantity
should  be controlled  directly  with  an  outright  ban  or a vigorously
enforced  limit.18
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A  pollution abatement standard is preferred to a pollution tax.
The requlator, who must set either a tax, t, or a standard, a,
in the  face  of uncertainty  about the  exact  location of  the
marginal  cost  of  abatement curve, will  choose  to equate the
expected marginal cost, EfMC], with the marginal benefit, MB,
of abatement. The optimal level of abatement will, in contrast,
be given by the intersection  of the true MC of abatement (either
MC" or MC') with the MB of  abatement.  A tax, t, will induce
abatement of only a"  units from a firm with high costs (MC")  and
a very  large amount, a',  from a  firm with  low costs  (MC').
These abatement levels are not close to the optimal levels, and
they result in losses of societal net benefits measured by the
large lined triangles.  In contrast, an abatement standard, a,
will come much closer to the optimal level of abatement when
casts are either high or low, and the resulting welfare loss is
smaller (measured by the small darkly shaded triangles).  The
comparative advantage of a standard to a tax emerges because of
the relatively steep slope of the MS of abatement curve.
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A pollution tax is preferred  to an abatement standard.  The
regulator,  who must issue  a tax, t, or a standard,  a, in the
face of uncertainty  about  the exact location  of the marginal
cost  of  abatement  curve,  will  equate  the  expected  marginal  cost,
E(MC],  with  the marginal  benefit,  MB, of abatement. A tax  will
induce  abatement  levels  of a" or a' if the true  marginal  cost
is  MC" or  MC' respectively. These  abatement  levels  (a"  and  a')
are  close  to  the  optimal abatement levels (given as  the
abatement  levels  which  equate  the  true  MC of abatement  with  the
MB).  In contrast, if the standard is used, far too much
abatement  is  required  of a firm  with  high  abatement  costs (MC")
and far too little  abatement  is required of a firm with low
abatement costs  (MC').  The  relatively large errors occur
because  the  marginal  cost  of abatement  curve  is  steeply  sloped,
compared  to the MB curve.
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1. Much  of  our summary of air pollution problems  in developing
countries  is  taken  from  a  paper  written  by  Alan  J.  Krupnick
entitled "Urban  Air Pollution in  Developing Countries: Problems and
Policies."  It was prepared  for a  UNU/WIDER Conference  on  "The
Environment and Emerging Development Issues," Helsinki, September
3-7, 1990.
2. Indoor pollution poses less of a social problem, invoking the
need for a government policy, because the cost of such pollution is
borne  mostly  by  the  polluter  himself.  Rather  than  being  an
externality, the problem of indoor pollution may be one of lack of
information  or mis-information, as well as an inadequate market
structure  which  makes  alternative  fuels  unavailable  to  rural
households.
3. Paradoxically, recent steps by the state-run oil company PEMEX
to reduce lead in  gasoline may have had the effect of raising ozone
levels in Mexico City.  In the absence of catalytic converters on
most  Mexican cars,  the unleaded gasoline introduced by PEMEX  in
1986 caused ozone levels to shoot up.  The relatively modest ozone
standard of 0.11 ppm is exceeded on more than 300 days each year
(Nuccio, Ornelas, and Restrepo, 1990).
4.  For  a  discussion  of  benefit-cost  techniques  for  evaluating
public  infrastructure  projects  in  developing  countries,  the
interested reader is directed to Dixon and Hufschmidt  (1986).  In
one chapter, they evaluate the benefits and costs of additional
water treatment facilities in a suburban region of Beijing.
5.  This  was  first  noticed  in  medieval  Europe  where  common
pasturelands  were typically  overgrazed and  less productive  than
private pasturelands.  Much of a country's air and water resources
are common property and subject to this "tragedy of the commons".
6. In fact to the extent that the refining of gasoline involves
external costs of air pollution, the price paid at the pump is less
than the social cost of producing the gasoline.
7. This assumes that the private supply price of gasoline remains
constant at one dollar when the Pigouvian tax is imposed.  More
generally, the private supply price of gasoline may fall when a tax
is imposed.
8. Payments to consumers would be undesirable under circumstances
where  such payments  may attract "nuisance" claims--for  example,
households  moving  into  areas  of  high  pollution,  at  a  cost  to
themselves, in order to receive the compensating payments.
699.  Because  the  policy  of paying  not to  consume gasoline  would
elicit false representations about the level of gasoline that the
consumer would purchase in the absence of the payment, this policy
is  inferior  to  the  more  direct  policy  of  taxing  gasoline
consumption on practical grounds.
10. To achieve least cost pollution abatement it is also necessary
that gasoline consumption  by each consumer type impose the same
social cost of pollution on the economy.
11. These figures are based on Table 3 in Poterba (1991).
12.  Shah  and Larsen  (1991) have  shown that  a  carbon  tax  could
appreciably reduce emissions of local and regional pollutants such
as  nitrous  oxides,  carbon  monoxide,  particulates  and  sulphur
dioxide.
13. Strictly  speaking,  the comparison  between expected marginal
benefits and costs of crime is appropriate only if the individual
is risk-neutral.  For a discussion of the optimal frequency and
magnitude of fines under conditions of risk-aversion, see Polinsky
and Shavell  (1979).
14. Harrington  (1988) and Russell  (1990) both use a Markov game
model of enforcement which emphasizes the importance of past firm
behavior.  Enforcement  costs associated with  a  target  level  of
compliance  are  found  to  be  lessened  by  placing  firms  into
categories with different monitoring probabilities based on past
performance records.
15. While tradeable permit programs have been somewhat successful
in the United States, and the new Clean Air Act encourages their
future use as an integral part of the regulatory structure of the
U.S., Hahn (1989)  and Hahn and Hester (1987)  have also noted their
failure to deliver on their theoretical efficiency properties  in
practice.
16. Enforcement practices in  the United States and other developed
countries are far from optimal.  Magat, Krupnick, and Harrington
(1986),  Russell, Harrington, and Vaughn (1986),  and Russell (1990)
suggest  that  increasing  enforcement  budgets,  restructuring
enforcement  procedures,  and  stiffening  fines  for  noncompliance
would be desirable.
17.  Baron  (1985)  has  an  interesting  model  of  noncooperative
regulatory  behavior  in which  an environmental protection  agency
must take as given the pricing policies of a utility regulator.
Not  surprisingly,  welfare  is  lower  in  the  noncooperative
equilibrium  than  in  a  cooperative  one  in  which  pricing  and
environmental policies are coordinated.
7018. The case for command and control environmental regulations  is
also strengthened for industries comprised of only a few relatively
homogeneous  firms  where  the  efficiency  advantages  of  flexible
market-based incentives are not likely to be large.  Large state-
controlled industries may be examples of this.
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